Iran’s missile and drone attack on Israel had, by the end of this week, become one of the most interpreted events in recent modern history. Then, in the early hours of Friday, came reports of Israel’s riposte. As in June 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated in a moment that ultimately led to the first world war, these shots were heard around the world, even if few can agree conclusively on what they portend.
By one de minimis account, Tehran was merely sending a performative warning shot with its attack last Saturday, almost taking its ballistic missiles out for a weekend test drive. The maximalist version is that this was a state-on-state assault designed to change the rules of the Middle East. By swarming Israel with so many projectiles, such an assessment goes, Iran was prepared to risk turning Israel into a mini-Dresden of 1945 and was only thwarted by Israeli strategic defences and, crucially, extraordinary cooperation between the US, Israel and Sunni Gulf allies.
Whatever Iran’s ultimate intention, its assault and now Israel’s reported counterattack have presented the Gulf states with dilemmas and acute choices, according to Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations. How they respond may determine the outcome of the crisis.
The key question is: do the Sunni monarchies led by Saudi Arabia fear Iran and its proxies more than they detest Israel and the damage it is inflicting on Palestinians and regional stability?
For the past six months, that choice has been suppressed, as Iran and the Sunni states have forged a fragile united front. In January, Saudi Arabia ensured that Iran had a seat at the table through a joint meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (GCC-IOC).
Nevertheless, the two sides have resolute disagreements – over a two-state solution, a future role for Hamas, and whether state boycotts or disinvestment, once a common tool of the Arab states against Israel, should be used in this crisis to put the pressure on Israel that Joe Biden was not willing to deploy.
Further, Iran has made no secret of its desire to see the US driven out of the region, a vision that the Gulf states do not share.
Cooperation with Israel
At issue is whether Arab states’ cooperation with Israel to repel Iran’s attack denotes something bigger and more permanent. One school of thought is articulated by Martyn Idynk, a former US ambassador to Israel, who told a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) briefing of the Iranian attack: “What happened … is the Sunni Arabs, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia, came out of the closet and made it clear that the threat from Iran was far greater than anything. What we discovered was that the strategic coordination between the US and Israel is a lot further along than most of us knew … and [Arab states] who have been attacked by Iranian missiles and rockets before now have a credible defence umbrella that is part of a US-Sunni-Israel strategic cooperation arrangement.”
He said the Gulf states no longer cared if the world knew about this alliance and that as long as the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, could show a sensitivity to Arab concerns, the basis existed to develop the Israeli-Sunni relationship.
It is certainly true that the Gulf states’ role in the defence of Israel has been long in the making. “We have been practising our steps together over and over for years,” said one British official. This is based on the supposition that the Arab states and Israel are “frenemies”.
Speaking about the defence operation launched against the incoming barrage from Tehran, the CFR fellow Max Boot said: “This is a huge win for this de facto Centcom alliance and this new air defence network. A 99% interception rate is off the charts. The US played a huge role, but so did the Arabs.”
Some Gulf nations have been more coy about their role than others, fearing a domestic backlash. Qatar had no involvement despite hosting the largest US base in the Middle East. Equally, no US F-35s flew from Dhafra air base in the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait may have allowed US planes into the sky, not to attack Iran missiles, but to carry out “routine intelligence” sorties. Saudi Arabia’s airborne warning and control system was operational, possibly providing intelligence.
Above all, Jordan made no effort to disguise the fact that it was shooting down Iranian drones to defend its sovereign airspace, prompting angry exchanges between the two countries. These included Jordan accusing Iran of having used the militant Muslim Brotherhood group and its Iraqi militia proxies for months to mount infiltration operations on its territory to stir up the largest Palestinian population in the region.
The US military has for years been advocating an integrated air defence alliance, stitching together the Gulf states and Israel.
Stage one was the Abraham accords in 2020, through which Bahrain and the UAE normalised relations with Israel. Stage two happened in September 2021 with the relocation of Israel into Centcom, the US-Middle East combatant command that includes Arab states.
The question now is whether the latest events will result in an anti-Iranian air defence alliance, and if so, on what terms.
Dana Stroul, who until December was the most senior civilian official at the Pentagon with responsibility for the Middle East, insisted: “Whatever regional politicians may say, the military, security and intelligence establishments of both the Arab states and Israel are quite clear – that Iran is the centre of gravity for instability, the export of terrorism and its illicit nuclear weapons programme.”
Little attempt has been made in the Saudi press to disguise Riyadh’s irritation with Iran. In Arab News, Abdulaziz Sagar, the chair of the Gulf Research Centre, wrote: “The Iranian leadership has tried to position itself as the guardian of the rights of the Palestinian people and the leading player in the Palestinian struggle against Israel. This policy turned into the hijacking of the Palestinian cause and employing the plight of the Palestinians in an utterly obscure manner to support Iran’s expansionist and interventionist regional policy and national interests.”
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He added: “The inevitable outcome of the Iranian missile attack on Israel is the breakdown of the myth … that the Iranian leaders imparted on the imaginations of the Arab world: that supporting Iran, its revolution and its leaders is the only way to effectively deal with Israeli arrogance and aggression.”
In Israel, politicians hope the Saudis will see the week’s events as a turning point. The defence minister, Yoav Gallant, said: “We have an opportunity here to establish a strategic alliance against this serious threat from Iran, which threatens to put nuclear explosives on the heads of these missiles.”
But Stroul urged caution. “If this integrated air defence is about the sovereign airspace of our partners, there is room to work together, but if we try to push this into an anti-Iran, pro-Israel coalition, our partners will be nervous.”
Furthermore, some regard it as overblown triumphalism to suggest that the Gulf states are about to meaningfully intensify relations with Israel. Lovatt said Arab nations’ cooperation with the response to Iran’s attack could be seen simply as an attempt to limit the damage inflicted by Tehran, and so prevent an escalatory Israeli response.
He said Riyadh’s foreign policy was on a new course of putting its own economy first, and that was the purpose of the Saudi-Iranian agreement reached in 2023 with the help of Iraq and China.
Palestinian future
Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, Jordan, the UAE and Egypt, had in recent months invested heavily in their own Palestinian peace plan, he pointed out. This included proposals for a ceasefire, followed by an Arab international protection force operating in both Gaza and, significantly, the West Bank. Under the plan, the protection force would be formed at the request of the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and not be externally imposed. This would be the precursor to peace talks lasting no more than two years leading to the formation of a Palestinian state.
All parties would have to agree to this end point, presenting an obstacle for Netanyahu. The plan promised Israeli regional recognition and integration at the end stage. Lovatt said the Arab states had hoped to release the plan in March, but it had been delayed by the US. A key element would include giving Hamas a role within a rejuvenated Palestinian leadership organisation.
It was possible, Lovatt said, that Iran could be brought on board for this, despite its longstanding opposition to a two-state solution. Noting that Iran signed a GCC-IOC statement supporting a two-state solution in January, he said that should a concrete plan emerge for this, Palestinians, including Hamas, accepted it may be possible to persuade Tehran.
Although there is widespread cynicism about Saudi intentions towards the Palestinians, many British officials insisted Riyadh was speaking enthusiastically about the possibility of staging a peace conference. Saudi diplomats themselves have denied that they would jettison the Palestinians if Biden met Riyadh’s demands for its own security in return for normalisation with Israel.
Tobias Borck, the Middle East lead at the the RUSI defence thinktank, said: “The Palestinian issue stands alongside Riyadh’s own domestic national interests, but I think the Saudis are keenly aware that the kind of stability they want in the region is only really possible when this volatility from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is somehow tamed.”
On this basis, he noted, Saudi Arabia would resist more conflict with Iran for now, regarding it as a diversion, and instead insist the world’s gaze must not turn from Gaza.
