The IDF ended the intense fighting in Gaza over two months ago. At the height of the ground invasion, about 20 brigades were in the Strip. At the beginning of April, the 98th Division left the Strip, and thus Israel completed the evacuation of about 95% of soldiers in Gaza. The hostages and Rafah were left behind, the two major lifelines of Hamas.
It is obvious that rounding up the enemy, encircling him, and cutting him off from his supply base is the cornerstone of military strategy. In the War of Independence, Israel decided to push into the Negev by encircling the Egyptian army in Al-Faluja. In the Six-Day War, the paratroopers under Sharon's command were dropped to block the Mitla Pass, and the Yom Kippur War came to an end following the encirclement of the Third Army.
Immediately after October 7, Israel enjoyed enormous and complete support from the US administration and most Western governments. The obvious question is, therefore, why didn't Israel take advantage of this support in the first months of the campaign for the occupation of Rafah and the complete defeat of Hamas in the south?
Netanyahu has a collection of negative personality traits, but stupidity is not one of them. He is also very experienced in managing and indoctrinating people. Therefore, the fact that Israel ended the ground maneuver in Gaza and voluntarily dropped all the levers of pressure from October-December 2023, at a time when Hamas is far from eliminated, and the hostages are still in the tunnels, is concerning.
Netanyahu's real intentions and goals for current war
The war in Gaza ended with a weak response simply because Netanyahu prefers a weakened Hamas that still controls Gaza, over any other entity that receives international recognition and cooperation. This is for his personal and political reasons that are not hard to comprehend.
Channel 12 announced last week that an international option for a solution is being examined, according to which "The UN Security Council may appoint an international transitional authority, a task force based on NATO, which will enter the Gaza Strip for a limited period of 5 years. During this, the real foundation for the Palestinian state will be built. The body will also be responsible for the reconstruction of Gaza, the construction of the state institutions in the Gaza Strip - and the preparation for elections after 5 years. If this model is successful, it will also move to the West Bank."
In other words, placing NATO troops in the Strip brings to the front of the stage the elephant in the room, the one Netanyahu worked so hard to hide throughout his years of office. In any way forward to a post-Hamas world, it will no longer be possible to avoid the Palestinian matter and the demands of the US and the world on this topic. This will also lead directly to the dissolution of the Ben-Gvir-Smotrich-Netanyahu government. This shows the rationale that led Smotrich to declare in 2015 that "Hamas is an asset" and that Netanyahu said at the Likud party meeting in 2019 that we should support the strengthening of Hamas. These ideologies have not changed at all since October 2023.
On the contrary, they have only gotten stronger. From the fact that any alternative to Hamas means a real discussion of the future of the territories, Netanyahu's real war goal was derived from the weakening of Hamas, but not their total elimination.
Hamas, weakened but alive and in control of Gaza, is the key to Netanyahu's chances of allowing the status quo to remain in place, including his remaining in power. Now, he must find a way to accuse others, through his messengers, of achieving his own goal. In this regard, MK Gotliv's latest tweets directly clarify who is to blame for failing to eliminate Hamas.
"The US has castrated Israel's levers of pressure on Hamas. It has prevented an attack in Rafah for 3 months!" Gotliv stated. "It pushed for a massive expansion of the amount of aid trucks to Gaza. In fact, it expected Israel to stop fighting in Gaza."
Explanations of this kind are to be expected and they will increase over time from other agents. The second challenge will be to generate enough attention in other sectors until the public understands why Hamas has not been eliminated. In this regard, one should expect, among other things, the verbal and physical growth of the fronts in the North and East. Hamas will remain in control of Gaza. The shared interests between Sinwar and Netanyahu are simply too great to allow the IDF to succeed. Sounds unbelievable? Let's let the facts, not the government representatives, speak.