The San Diego Padres Have Better Vibes Under Manager Mike Shildt

It is too soon to know if the San Diego Padres are better this season under Mike Shildt than they were last season under Bob Melvin. The club lost a bunch of players from the underwhelming 2023 club (82-80, third place finish), to wit: Cy Young winner Blake Snell, All-Star slugger Juan Soto, and All-Star reliever Josh Hader. In addition (or subtraction), the pitching staff also lost Michael Wacha and Seth Lugo. However, the team added left-handed pitchers Yuki Matsui and Wandy Peralta; right-handed reliever Woo-Suk Go; and utilityman, Jurickson Profar. Plus, the team decided to break camp with rookie outfielder Jackson Merrill, who has proven that he is ready for primetime, hitting .284 in his first 35 games.

Last year, through their first 37 games, the Padres were 19-18, slashing .232/.321/.393, with a team-ERA of 3.96.

This year, through their first 37 games, they are 18-19, slashing .259/.325/.412, with a team-ERA of 4.28. Their pitchers have struck out nine less batters, but also walked 14 less. So, are they better? Who’s to say?

But, the vibes in San Diego are different this season. Maybe the absence of Soto, who never really fit in with the team, helped. Maybe moving Xander Bogaerts to second base to make room for Ha-Seong Kim to play short – who is considerably better defensively – helped. Maybe not having to play defense behind the slog that is a Blake Snell start every five days helped. Or maybe Mike Shildt has brought a better approach to this particular club.

Just the other night, Shildt was placed on the horns of a dilemma, where the advanced stats and analytics could only be so helpful. But the choice he was forced to make was an early test of his stewardship of this team and these players.

Here is the situation he faced, the thinking behind the options, what he decided, how it paid off, and what it potentially portends as the team moves into the second quarter of their season.

The Situation:

Bottom of the fifth inning, Padres leading 1-0, one out, runners on the corners, Jake Cronenworth at the plate. Cronenworth hits a routine grounder to second, scoring the run, and moving Fernando Tatis, Jr. to second with two outs.

Cronenworth immediately signaled to the bench that there had been catcher’s interference, and the home plate umpire confirmed the same. With catcher’s interference, the hitting team is allowed to accept the outcome of the play rather than take the free base. In this instance, Shildt could choose his own adventure:

1. Live with the outcome of the play, giving the Padres a 2-0 lead, and leaving a runner on second with two outs; or
2. Accept the catcher’s interference, take the run off the board, and load the bases with one out for Manny Machado.

The Analysis:

Tom Tango has done all of the math, which, to be sure, the team has readily available in the dugout on their iPads and in their notebooks. But, for the normies, Tango breaks it down as follows (simplified here, as Tango goes considerably deeper in his analysis):

If Shildt had chosen Option #1, the “run expectancy” with two outs and a runner on second is 0.325. Add to that the run that would have scored, and the Padres’ run expectancy for that inning would have been 1.325. If Shildt had chosen Option #2, the run expectancy with the bases loaded and one out is 1.590. Stop right there and the decision is easy.

But, there is also a concept called “win expectancy.”

To quote Tango: “The typical home team, up by 1, with the bases loaded and 1 out, has a .799 chance of winning. But, give up the runner on 1B to an out, and plate the runner on 3B for a run, and the win expectancy will go up .811. In other words, we lose .012 wins by loading the bases (at least with an average batter batting).” With the additional data at hand, the choice is not so easy.

To truly analyze the situation, Shildt needed to consider the upcoming hitter. In this case, it would be Machado. Over his career, Machado has hit into 189 double plays, doing so 13.1% of the time he is batting with a runner on first base and less than two outs (note, the league average is 10.5%). So, there is about a 1 in 7 chance that Machado would hit into an inning-ending double play if Shildt chose Option #2, costing the Padres the run they had already plated. By contrast, in this type of situation, Machado has historically made a productive out 29.4% of the time, which is better than the league average of 28.6%. The slugger also has 12 career grand slams in 132 such opportunities.

With all of the facts available, this one came down to the feel of the manager. And, oh, the decision had to be made in less than 30 seconds – between batters.

The Decision/The Outcome:

In the end, Shildt took the run off the board. It is entirely possible that Shildt didn’t consult the iPad or the notebooks when making his choice. After the game, he credited his “Charlotte-Mecklenburg public education,” and stated, simply, “You can have the bases loaded and one out for Manny Machado? I am going to bet on Manny Machado.” Machado promptly doubled the first pitch he saw into the left-centerfield gap, clearing the bases, and giving the Padres a 4-0 lead. Score one (or three) for Mike Shildt’s process/research/gut.

What It Portends:

When asked about the decision after the game, Machado was quoted as saying: “That’s Shildty. It’s just the confidence he’s been giving us all year. It truly speaks volumes.”

We have nearly five more months to learn what will become of the 2024 Padres. They are currently in second place in the NL West, 5.5 games behind the Dodgers. For a little context, they are 4.5 games behind the Dodgers by Pythagorean winning percentage, and 6.5 runs behind by BaseRuns. Can they catch the “beasts to the north”? Highly unlikely. But, can they hang around in playoff contention and make it interesting in September? Well, with Mike Shildt at the helm, that seems highly likely.